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THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTING: 
Effects on Rival Firms at Home 
 
 
 I. Introduction 
When foreign firms list their shares on a U.S. stock exchange, this may affect the 
stock price of the listing firm. It may also affect stock prices of firms in the same industry 
and country as the listing firm, as investors revise their expectations of firm values. This 
paper studies the stock price impact on home-market rival firms of firms’ cross-listing in 
the United States. 
Existing empirical evidence indicates that a firm listing its shares in the United 
States experiences a positive change in its share price at home. A survey of the effects of 
listing shares abroad is conducted by Karolyi (1998). Overall, evidence indicates that 
companies experience an increase in home-market value in the month around the listing. 
Miller (1999) examines the benefits of cross-listing around the announcement of listing 
and shows positive abnormal returns when a foreign firm announces a U.S. listing. 
Although there are positive effects of cross-listing on cross-listing firms, it is also 
important to study the impact of cross-listing on other domestic firms to gauge  the real 
benefits of cross-listing to the domestic economy. In this paper we study the valuation 
effects of cross-listing on these firms’ primary rivals. 
 Both positive or negative spillover effects may be experienced by the primary 
home-market rivals which are not listed in the U.S. On the one hand, the traditional risk 
sharing explanation for cross-listing predicts a positive risk-sharing benefit on rival firms. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that rival firms may be harmed by a firm’s U.S. 
  2listing. The more recent bonding, growth opportunities, and signaling explanations for 
cross-listing would suggest a negative impact on rival firms.  
The conventional explanation for cross-listing has been related to the cross-listing 
firms’ benefit from the overcoming of investment barriers. This risk sharing hypothesis 
poses that firms benefit from cross-listing in the U.S. since their cost of capital falls with 
the cross-listing (Errunza and Losq (1985) and Stulz (1999)).  In support of this, Foerster 
and Karolyi (1999) and Errunza and Miller (2000) find a strong negative impact of cross-
listings on the cost of capital; and Eaton, Nofsinger and Weaver (2007) show that the cost 
of capital falls for cross listing firms, and that the size of the fall is related to the 
disclosure quality of the home country. Reasons for this include their being priced in a 
global context rather than in the relatively segmented domestic market and also the 
enhanced liquidity resulting from being traded in the U.S. market. Other local firms can 
be affected if they now become priced in a global context as barriers to international 
investing are reduced for them too. If there is also a fall in the cost of capital for rival 
firms that are not cross-listed, then rivals may benefit from the cross-listing. To the 
degree that firms are correlated with the listing firm, the cost of capital should also fall 
for other firms in the country (Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1987); Eun, Claessens 
and Jun (1995)), thus creating a positive impact on rival firms.  
The bonding explanation for cross-listing is related to the additional scrutiny that 
firms go through by listing on a U.S. exchange. Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) 
posit that firms cross-list as a means to “bond” with the U.S. market and U.S. laws, 
setting a mechanism for managers to avoid taking excessive private benefits, and 
therefore enjoy better access to external financing markets. Reese and Weisbach (2002) 
  3provide support for the bonding hypothesis as they find that firms from countries with 
weak investor protection are more likely to cross-list in the U.S., and that after cross-
listing they significantly increase their equity offerings both inside and outside the U.S. 
Additional support for the bonding hypothesis is found in Doidge (2004) and in Doidge et 
al. (2007) who study ownership structure before a U.S. listing and changes in this 
ownership around the listing event.  
The growth opportunities hypothesis is intrinsically related to the bonding 
explanation for cross-listing. A U.S. listing improves the protection of minority 
shareholders by reducing the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in 
expropriation, making it easier for firms to raise external capital, and thus improving their 
ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. In support of this hypothesis, Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2004) analyze the difference in firm values for foreign firms that list 
in the U.S. and those that do not. They find that the value of firms that list in the U.S. is 
higher than the value of firms from the same country that do not list in the U.S. by 16.5% 
on average, and explain the differential by arguing that cross-listed firms are better able 
to take advantage of growth opportunities. The implication of the growth opportunities 
and bonding hypothesis for rival firms is that as cross-listing firms are seen as having 
relatively higher growth prospects, rival firms are seen at a relative disadvantage, and we 
therefore expect a negative impact on their stock price. If rivals are viewed as firms with 
relatively lower growth opportunities and greater controlling shareholder control 
compared to the listing firm, this relative disadvantage could create a negative impact of 
the cross-listing on the rival firm.  
  4In the signaling literature, firms cross-list as a means to signal their high quality to 
investors and distinguish themselves from low-quality rivals. Theoretical models by 
Fuerst (1998), Moel (1999) and Cantale (1998) predict that firms will list in overseas 
markets as a means of reducing information asymmetry and signaling their high quality 
to investors. Using a rational expectations model, Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier 
(1999) find an equilibrium where exchanges engage in a ‘race for the top’ in which they 
compete for order flow by raising disclosure requirements and lowering costs of trading. 
More recently, the theoretical model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) shows that 
firms benefit from listing on exchanges with high disclosure standards only if information 
producers can obtain information about the firms at low cost. Thus firms will list when 
they have a significant base of low-cost information producers, but would like to enlarge  
that base or to take advantage of the higher transparency of the foreign exchange. This 
explanation for cross-listing predicts a negative impact on rival firms. As cross-listing 
firms distinguish themselves from low-quality rivals, we would expect a negative 
spillover on rival firms.  
Given prior theoretical and empirical work, we believe the impact of a cross-
listing on rival firms is ambiguous. While rival firms might benefit from the cross-listing 
as the risk sharing hypothesis would suggest, rivals could also be seen at a relative 
disadvantage to the listing firm because of their decision not to list. The benefits or costs 
of a firm’s cross-listing on other country constituents are still issues that need to be 
explored in order to determine the real benefits of cross-listings to markets as a whole. 
While we concentrate on the spillover effects that come about to the cross-listing firms’ 
primary rival, there are studies that have explored other closely related issues.  
  5Karolyi (2004) examines a sample of emerging equity markets and studies the 
effects of cross-listings on stock market development. He finds that while there are 
benefits, the benefits come from the cross-listing firms themselves and observes negative 
spillover effects of cross-listings on the local market for non-ADR firms.  Levine and 
Schmukler (2007), using a panel of 55 emerging countries, find that internationalization 
has a negative spillover effect on the liquidity of domestic firms.  
Fernandes (2003) looks at the impact of cross listings on home market firms when 
the first ADR is created in a sample of emerging market ADRs. By looking at the first 
ADR in a country (sometimes thought of as a market liberalization event) and 
concentrating in emerging markets, he tests the risk sharing hypothesis for his sample 
firms. As the risk-sharing effects are most likely to accrue to the emerging market firms 
upon the creation of the first ADR program in the country, the study provides evidence 
supporting the hypothesis as he finds a positive effect on home-market firms when the 
first ADR is created. However, by not including developed market firms and more recent 
cross-listings, it is hard to conclude if the risk sharing effect of a cross-listing on other 
firms in the country is dominating or dominated by other negative spillover effects.  
An additional paper that looks at the effects of cross-listings on other firms is that 
by Bradford, Martin and Whyte (2002). They analyze the impact of cross-listings on both 
U.S. rivals and domestic-market rivals, by looking at listing dates. Instead of focusing on 
a matched rival, they create portfolios of all rival firms in the industry for which data are 
available, and find a positive impact on U.S. rival firms. Using monthly prices, they do 
not find an effect on home market rival firms.  
  6Another concurrent study that addresses related issues is that by Lee (2004). He 
examines portfolios of firms from emerging markets, that are associated with firms that 
have listed in the United States, and finds that firms in the same industry as the listing 
firm tend to have negative abnormal returns when the listing is announced.  One of the 
main differences between our paper and his is that we analyze the impact on the primary 
rival of the listing firm. We do not use indexes of industry rivals since firms in the same 
industry might be very different in size and trading frequency. Further, we believe that 
the effects of firms being viewed at a relative disadvantage with respect to the listing 
firm, and the risk-sharing spillover effects of the cross-listing on other firms should be 
more important for similar firms, than for other firms in the industry.  
Our study contributes to the literature on cross-listings in several ways. First, we 
analyze the spillover effects of cross-listing on a specific group of firms from which we 
expect the strongest effects, namely the firm’s primary rivals. Second, we include in our 
analysis firms from both developed and emerging markets and explore their differences. 
Developed markets are important to study since the liberalization (or risk-sharing) effect 
is likely to be smaller on average for this group of firms, and including them in the 
analysis provides insights with respect to whether a liberalization effect is present. Third, 
we analyze the impact of cross-listing on rival firms at both the announcement of listing 
and the listing date itself. This provides insights as to when the spillover effects take 
place. Although rational expectations would predict no effect on the listing date, we 
expect an effect as long as there is some positive probability that the listing will not take 
place. Finally, we analyze cross-sectionally the abnormal returns of rival firms, which 
provide insights on what the important determinants of those spillover effects are.  
  7We use a sample of cross-listing firms to examine empirically the effects of cross-
listing on rival firms. In Section II will discuss the data and methodology used for 
empirically testing the rival firm effect of cross-listing.  Then in Section III, we present 
the empirical results that relate to the effects of cross-listing on rival firms. Our findings 
suggest that rival firms are hurt by the listing of other firms in their industry. Over an 11-
day window surrounding the listing date, rival firms experience a -2.20% mean 
cumulative abnormal return, which is significant at the 1% level. Rival firms from 
developed markets experience a statistically significant -2.35% cumulative abnormal 
return, while emerging market rival firms have a cumulative abnormal return of -1.44%. 
The abnormal return for emerging market firms is insignificant, and smaller when 
compared to their developed market counterparts. This is consistent with there being a 
risk-sharing effect present, as in emerging markets the positive liberalization effect is 
expected to be stronger on average than in developed markets. We also find a significant 
negative impact on rival firms on the day of the announcement of listing. On this day, 
rival firms experience a -0.32% mean abnormal return. In Section IV, we analyze the 
cross-sectional differences in the abnormal returns of rival firms. The results offer 
support for a risk sharing benefit being present in emerging market firms. We also find 
evidence supporting the bonding and growth opportunities explanations for cross-listing. 
Additionally, we find that the rival firm’s size and the number of days elapsed between 
the announcement of listing and the listing event are important determinants of the 
abnormal returns of rival firms.   
 
II. Data and Methodology 
  8Our sample was constructed by first gathering a list of all foreign firms that listed 
in the U.S. as Level II ADR , Level III ADR, or directly on the NYSE or NASDAQ; and 
eliminating those for which there was no data on Datastream
1,2. We then looked for the 
date on which these firms announced a forthcoming listing by searching the Lexis-Nexis 
database and Dow-Jones interactive. We restrict the sample by taking only those firms 
that have an identifiable announcement date. Next, we classified firms into industries 
from Datastream’s (level 4) industry classification. We then searched for a rival for these 
firms.  We do not use indexes of industry rivals since firms in the same industry might be 
very different in size and trading frequency. Additionally, as discussed previously the 
market liberalization effect and the negative spillover effect should be more important for 
primary rivals than for other firms in the industry. For each firm, we obtained the names 
of the firms from the same country in the same industry. Rivals were chosen by market 
capitalization on the day of listing. The rival firm is the firm from the same industry who 
had the closest market capitalization to the original firm on the day of listing.
3 Rival 
firms are firms that were not listed in the U.S. at the time of the listing by the listing firm. 
The result was a total of 146 firm-rival pairs from 21 countries. The listing dates of the 
                                                 
1 Most foreign companies are traded in the U.S. as American Depositary Receipts. An American 
Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a negotiable certificate denominated in U.S. dollars that represents the 
ownership of shares in a non-U.S. company. ADRs may trade on organized exchanges or over-the-counter 
(OTC) and can be either capital raising or not. Some foreign firms (mostly from Israel and Canada) cross-
list in the U.S. markets directly, without going through an ADR program. Our sample consists of both 
Level II and Level III ADRs, as well as direct listings of foreign firms.  
2 There are four types of ADRs. Level I ADRs trade over-the-counter and require no reconciliation to U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and so involve minimal disclosure under U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. Level II ADRs are for firms that list on a U.S. 
exchange but raise no new capital. Level III ADRs are for firms that want to raise capital and be listed on a 
U.S. exchange. Level II and Level III ADRs require U.S. GAAP reconciliation and full disclosure as with 
any U.S. firm. Finally, Rule 144A ADRs are for firms that seek private U.S. placements to qualified 
institutional buyers (QIBs). They do not require GAAP reconciliation or full SEC disclosure. 
3 Other papers in the ADR literature that have created data sets with matched firms and a similar matching 
criteria as ours include Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002), who match by country- industry-total assets; 
Errunza and Miller (2000), who match by country -market capitalization; and Lang, Ready, and Yetman 
(2003), who match by country- industry -total assets. 
  9original firms range from 1986 to 2002. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on our 
sample of firms.
4  
We use an event study approach to measure the impact of a firm’s listing on the 
rival firm. We measure the abnormal returns for the rival around the date that the listing 
firm listed in the U.S. The methodology for measuring abnormal returns is the following. 
Let’s call firm L the firm that listed in the U.S. and firm R the rival firm, which is not 
listed in the U.S. Then, normal returns for the rival (firm R) are calculated for a period 
before firm L lists in the U.S. If we let day 0 be the day that firm L lists (or announces 
listing) in the U.S., then we calculate normal returns using days -180 to -31 (150 days 
prior to the event window). To measure normal returns, the market model is applied. The 
equation estimated is: 
  it i i mt it RR α βε = ++  (1) 
where ( ) 0 it E ε =  and 
2 () it i Var ε ε σ = . Rit denotes return on security i at day t; Rmt is the 
return on the market portfolio in period t and  it ε  is an error term with mean zero.  i α ,  i β , 
and 
2
i ε σ  are parameters to be estimated by ordinary least squares. As a proxy for the 
market return, we use returns calculated from the corresponding Datastream local market 
index.  
                                                 
4 As an example of the matching procedure, let’s take one firm in our sample, Royal Bank of Canada. We 
look for other firms in the same industry that are not cross listed at the time of Royal Bank’s listing and we 
find seven matches. Then, we search for the market value of the firm on the day of listing. Royal Bank of 
Canada has a market value of C$9554.85 million. By matching it with the firm with closest market value, 
the match is Canadian Imperial Bank, with a C$ 7595.66 million market value. Three of the possible 
matches have market value of less than 1/30 of the market value of the listing firm.   It is very common that 
when we look at possible matches there are some firms in the industry that are very small compared to the 
cross-listing firm. As another example, Wolseley, a building company from the UK, has 33 possible 
matches, of which more than half are less than 1/4
th of its size.  
 
  10Abnormal returns are then used to measure the impact of creating an ADR 
program on the equity value of the firm. In order to measure abnormal returns, we first 
calculate the normal returns as just described for each firm. Then, using the parameter 
estimates  ˆi α  and  ˆ
i β  for each firm, we calculate abnormal returns for days -30 to +30 (the 
event window) by computing: 
** ˆ ˆˆ it it i i mt RR εα β =− −
*
                                                
 (2) 
where * denotes event window variables.
5 These abnormal returns measure the impact on 
the equity value of firm R when firm L’s ADR starts to trade (or announces trading). The 
test statistic we use is a standardized abnormal return test due to Patell (1976). This test 
statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis that the expected value of the standardized 
abnormal returns is equal to zero against the alternative that the expected value of the 
standardized abnormal returns is not equal to zero. A precision-weighted cumulative 
mean abnormal return is also computed. Finally, we report a Generalized Sign Z test.  
The test uses the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. The null hypothesis 
for this test is that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation period.  
 
III. The Effects of Cross-listing on Rival Firms 
 
 
5 As a further robustness check, we calculate abnormal returns using the following market model 
to estimate normal returns: 
it i Wi Wt Li Lt it RR R α ββ ε = +++  
where  ()0 it E ε =  and 
2 () it i Var ε ε σ = . Rit denotes return on security i at day t;   is the return on the world 
portfolio in period t, 
Wt R
Lt R  is the return on the local market portfolio in period t, and  it ε  is an error term with 
mean zero. As a proxy for the world (local) portfolio we use returns calculated from a Datastream world 
(local) index. The parameter estimates from this equation for each firm are  ˆi α ,  ˆ
Wi β  and  ˆ
Li β . Using these, 
abnormal returns are estimated as: 
** * * ˆˆ ˆˆ it it i Wi Wt Li Lt RR εα β β =− − −R  
where * denotes event window variables. The results do not vary under this specification. 
  11III.A. Impact on the Rival Firm around the Listing Date 
Table 2 presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns for windows of days  
(-5, -1), (-5, +1), (+1, +5) and (-5, +5), as well as the event date mean abnormal return  
(0, 0). The table also presents the number of firms that had positive abnormal returns on 
that respective day, the Z statistic and the Generalized Sign Z. During an 11 day window 
surrounding the listing date, we find a negative and statistically significant -2.20% 
abnormal return suggesting that rival firms are hurt by the listing.
6  We will consider 
announcement effects in the next section but here we stress that identifying the 
announcement day when news of the listing is revealed is problematic and subject to 
great error, so for now we center our estimation around the first day of listing
7.  
One may think that with rational expectations, there should only be an 
announcement effect and no further effect at the time of the listing.  However, there are, 
at least, two reasons why a listing effect could still exist beyond that realized at the 
announcement time.  First, there is always some positive probability that an announced 
U.S. listing may not actually occur.  A recent case in point is that of BMW, the German 
auto firm, who decided not to follow through with an announced U.S. listing
8.  Second, 
the risk-sharing effects of a U.S. listing may not be realized until the U.S.-traded shares 
are available for trading. 
 
                                                 
6 In contrast, we find a positive event day mean abnormal return for the listing firms in our sample.  
7 For a discussion of the complications of identifying announcement dates of future cross-listings see 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999).  
8 Even if the listing does take place, as long as there is a positive probability that it does not take place we 
would see both listing and announcement effects from cross-listing. Many firms have “postponed” their 
ADR programs creating uncertainty that the listing will actually take place, for example, both Bayer AG 
and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd postponed their NYSE listings.  
  12III.B. Impact on the Rival Firm around the Announcement Date 
We next study the impact on the rival firms of the announcement of a forthcoming 
U.S. listing. The results for the announcement dates should be taken with caution since 
identifying the announcement dates is subject to great error, and it may well be that the 
listing event is a more reliable date for analysis. Announcement dates were collected by 
looking at the first time there was an announcement of the forthcoming U.S. listing on 
either the Lexis-Nexis database or Dow-Jones Interactive. Table 3 presents the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns for the rival firms around the announcement date. The mean 
cumulative abnormal return around the (-5, 5) window is -0.45%, a value that does not 
differ significantly from zero. On the announcement date, we find a significant -0.3% 
abnormal return for rival firms. So only on the day that the public learns of the planned 
U.S. listing is there a statistically significant announcement effect.
9
 
III.C. Impact on Emerging vs. Developed Market Firms 
The impact of cross-listing on rival firms from emerging markets might differ from 
those of firms in developed markets. In international asset pricing models (Alexander, 
Eun and Janakiramanan (1987)) the additional risk premium associated with international 
restrictions to capital flows diminishes with the cross-listing. It follows that the reduction 
in the cost of capital for the cross-listing firm should be strongest for those firms coming 
from countries with stronger investment barriers. Although classifying countries by 
                                                 
9 As a robustness check, we estimate the listing effect using the same estimation window as used for the 
calculation of the announcement effect. Since during these dates there was no announcement of the firm’s 
intention to list, this should be a clean measure of the normal returns of the firm. Next, since there are some 
firms for which the announcement of a future U.S. listing fell during the listing event window, we 
eliminated those firms. Then an event study around the listing date is performed to see whether there is an 
impact on the rival firm. The results reinforce our previous findings. The mean cumulative abnormal return 
around a (-5, 5) window is –2.08% for the rival firms in our sample.  
  13segmentation is a difficult task (see Bekaert and Harvey (1995)), we assume that in 
general emerging markets are more segmented than developed markets. Thus, everything 
else equal we would expect the cost of capital to fall by more for firms from emerging 
markets when compared to firms from developed markets, as the investment barriers 
overcame by the cross-listing are larger on average in emerging markets than in 
developed markets.  
If stock price valuations associated with a U.S. cross-listing are dominated by a 
negative spillover effect, and if there is a market liberalization event present, then the 
post-listing price for rivals not listed in the U.S. should fall by more for rival firms from 
developed markets than the decrease for rival firms from emerging markets. This testable 
hypothesis helps disentangle the two effects studied. If there is a market liberalization 
effect, then we should expect differences between emerging and developed market firms, 
even if the negative spillover effect dominates the stock price valuation.  
We subdivide the sample into the 25 emerging market rivals, and the 121 
developed market rival firms. The results are shown in Table 4. Panel A shows the results 
for listing dates, and Panel B for announcement dates. The mean cumulative abnormal 
returns over the (-5, 5) day window for the developed and emerging sample are -2.35% 
and -1.44% respectively. The results for rival firms from emerging markets are not 
statistically different from zero. The evidence of a negative and persistent effect of the 
listing on rivals is stronger for firms in developed markets than those in emerging 
markets. This result suggests that the negative spillover effect is more important than the 
positive effect associated with a market liberalization, although the differences between 
emerging and developed market rival firms are consistent with the market liberalization 
  14effect being present and more important in emerging markets, so that there is no 
significant negative effect for these firms. We performed a test of the difference of the 
means of the two subsamples and found no significant results
10. The cross-sectional 
analysis in the next section will provide more insight on the differences between the two 
groups. Panel B of Table 4 shows that the mean cumulative abnormal return on the 
announcement date is -0.31% for developed market firms and -0.38% for emerging 
market firms. Again, the results for emerging market firms are insignificant, as are the 
tests of the differences between the two groups.  
  
IV.  Cross-sectional Differences in Abnormal Returns 
While the two effects discussed, the positive spillover effect due to liberalization 
and the negative spillover effect that could be due to firms being viewed at a relative 
disadvantage predict that the cross-listing effects on rival firms is indeterminate, our 
empirical results show that rival firms tend to be hurt by the listing. This suggests that 
either the negative effect that rival firms experience because of relatively lower growth 
prospects or a lower quality connotation is stronger than the positive liberalization effect, 
or that there is only a negative effect on rival firms and no positive liberalization effect. 
We analyze which of these two possibilities is true in this section, as we explore the 
cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns for rival firms for both listing and 
announcement dates. In section A, we present tests related to the risk sharing hypothesis. 
In section B, we present tests related to the negative spillover effect. Section C tests both 
hypothesis simultaneously.  
                                                 
10 Miller (1999) studies the market reaction to ADR listing announcements in the U.S, and finds that firms 
from emerging markets experienced nearly double the cumulative abnormal returns of firms from 
developed markets. The difference, however, was not statistically significant.  
  15The general model used for analysis is of the following form:  
  (5 , 5 ) CAR E VAR CONTROLS e αβ γ δ − =+ + + + ∑ ∑  (3) 
Where CAR(-5, 5) refers to the cumulative abnormal returns for a firm between dates –5 
and +5 relative to the listing or announcement date, E is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firms is from an emerging market and 0 otherwise; VAR are variables that we 
will use to test the hypotheses; and CONTROLS are a set of variables that may impact 
the return generating process as well.
11
  We use three other control variables in the regression specification besides the 
Emerging market dummy. First, the size of the rival firm, measured as the market 
capitalization of the firm on the day of listing or announcement of listing, respectively, 
for the listing and announcement event cross-sectional regressions. The market 
capitalization data is gathered from Datastream. Since larger firms are more likely to 
cross-list in the future (see Pagano et. al., 2002) then the negative effects that accrue to 
rival firms should be smaller for this group of firms. Therefore, we expect a positive 
coefficient on this variable that indicates that larger firms experience less negative effects 
of their rivals’ cross-listing. The second variable we use as a control variable is the 
proportion of sales abroad. Pagano, et al (2002) identify both the size of the firm and the 
proportion of sales abroad as the two characteristics that most impact the likelihood of 
cross-listing. As rival firms with higher foreign sales to total sales are more likely to 
cross-list in the future we might expect a different impact of the listing on firms with high 
or low foreign sales to total sales. We collect the proportion of sales abroad as of the 
                                                 
11 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this cross-sectional model.  
  16fiscal year-end prior to the cross-listing from Worldscope
12. Finally, the third control 
variable is the number of days that passed between the announcement of listing and the 
actual listing. As discussed earlier, we could possibly observe an effect on the rival firm 
at both the listing and at the announcement event. However, these effects could be 
different depending on how far away the listing and the announcement day are. The more 
distant the two dates are, the greater the uncertainty that the listing will actually take 
place. We test the hypotheses using the OLS model of equation (3) and Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.    
IV.A. Positive Spillover Effects 
  In the international asset pricing model of Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan 
(1987) there is an additional risk premium associated with segmented markets, and when 
investment barriers are reduced this risk premium diminishes as risk is shared by a larger 
investor base.
13 Stulz (1999) argues that globalization reduces the cost of capital for all 
firms in the country. Although globalization may be a slow process, the date of the first 
ADR has been thought of as a liberalization event, since the first ADR represents a firm 
overcoming country restrictions and foreign investment barriers. To the degree that an 
ADR represents an overcoming of investment barriers only for similar firms, the ADR 
listing would represent an industry-liberalization event. However, we might also think of 
an ADR as a firm-specific liberalization effect, where the cost of capital falls for cross-
listed firms but not for their home-listed rivals. In this case one would expect the negative 
                                                 
12 Because of the imposition of this control variable, and other company characteristics variables used later 
on in the analysis, the sample size for the cross-sectional analysis falls to 70 observations. However, we re-
did our event study analysis for these 70 firms and the results from the previous section were similar in 
terms of magnitude and significance of the coefficients with respect to the full sample of firms.  
13 Empirical evidence that the cost of capital falls with the cross-listing includes Foerster and Karolyi 
(1999), Errunza and Miller (2000) and Eaton, Nofsinger and Weaver (2007).  
  17spillovers to dominate share pricing so that the price of the rival firm would fall. If 
liberalization is an industry event, the impact on the price of the rival firm depends on 
whether the effect of the lower cost of capital is stronger than the effect of the rivals 
being seen as lower quality firms relative to the listing firm. Further, if an ADR is a firm-
specific liberalization event, then we should observe that the listing hurts rival firms as 
there is only the revision of quality and growth opportunities to be priced.  
Theory suggests that there might be a positive impact of the listing on rival firms 
if the cost of capital falls for all firms that are correlated with the listing firm as risk is 
shared by a greater number of shareholders. We found a net negative impact of the listing 
on rival firms on average. In this section, we explore cross-sectional differences in 
abnormal returns of rival firms to see if there are individual firm differences that vary 
systematically with the determinants of the liberalization effect..  
IV.A.1. Correlation with the Listing Firm 
According to the risk sharing hypothesis there should be a positive impact of the 
listing on rival firms, and the impact should be stronger for rivals whose returns are more 
correlated with the listing firm. This hypothesis predicts a positive impact on the listing 
firm as investment barriers are overcome with the U.S. listing. To the degree that these 
barriers are defeated also for similar firms in the industry, they should also benefit. The 
model by Eun, Claessens, and Jun (1995) predicts a “spill-over effect” of international 
listing that is greater for firms more highly correlated with the listing firm. We 
investigate whether the abnormal returns that firms experience depend on the correlation 
of their returns with the listing firm prior to the listing. We measure correlation between 
the two firms’ (lister/rival) returns during the estimation window period (days –211 to –
  1831) around the listing and announcement dates. Results are reported in Model 1 of Table 
5. We find no relationship between correlation and abnormal returns of the rival, for 
either listing (in Panel A) or announcement (in Panel B) dates. In Model 2, in addition to 
the correlation between the two firms’ returns we include an interaction dummy, 
correlation*emerging. In this model ‘correlation’ measures if there is a different 
relationship between abnormal returns and correlation for developed market firms, and 
the interaction term measures the relationship for emerging market firms. We would 
expect the effect of correlation on returns of emerging-market rivals to be stronger than 
that of developed since the risk sharing effects should particularly accrue to these firms in 
segmented markets. The results of Model 2 are supportive of the risk sharing hypothesis 
at the time of announcement of cross-listing: strong positive effect of correlation on 
abnormal returns of rivals for emerging market firms, with no effect for developed 
market firms. Further, we find a negative coefficient on the emerging market dummy that 
suggests that there are other characteristics of emerging markets that matter for abnormal 
returns of rivals too. The model is supportive of significant differences among emerging 
and developed market firms. 
IV.A.2. Time and Market Integration 
Next, we split the sample by date of listing. We propose that there should be a 
positive impact on rivals in earlier years, as the countries are being liberalized. As the 
markets become more integrated, this positive liberalization effect should fall. The 
negative spillover explanations for cross-listing do not predict differences on rival firms 
from early or late listings. We construct a variable called “Time of listing”, which equals 
1 if the firm listed in the earliest year in our sample (1986), equals 2 for the following 
  19year (1987), and so on until the last value of 17 (corresponding to the year 2002). We 
then run a regression and use as independent variable “Time of listing”. The results 
presented in Model 3 of Table 5 show that the coefficient of “time of listing” is not 
significant.  In Model 4 we include an interaction term time of listing*emerging to try to 
capture the difference in emerging market firms. Once again, the coefficient of “Time of 
Listing” is not significant, as neither is the interaction term. Although the coefficients for 
‘time of listing’ are not significant under any specification, the coefficient signs correctly 
capture the risk sharing hypothesis predictions, where late listings are more negatively 
impacted by the listing, especially in the case of emerging markets.  
Finally, Model 5 in Table 5 includes all the variables used for testing the risk 
sharing hypothesis used in Models 1-4. The significant relationship between correlation 
and abnormal returns for rivals from emerging markets at the time of the announcement 
of listing are robust to the introduction of the other variables. Although our previous 
results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the negative spillovers dominate share pricing, the 
results in Table 5 show support for a risk sharing benefit taking place among rival firms 
in emerging markets at the time of the listing announcement. The results of Table 5 also 
suggest that the size of the rival firm is an important determinant of its abnormal returns, 
as we find a positive relationship between size and abnormal returns of rival firms.  
 
IV.B. Negative Spillover Effects 
In Section III, we observe a net negative valuation impact of cross-listing on rival 
firms. Why are rival firms hurt with the cross-listing? Stulz (1999) argues that by cross-
listing firms identify themselves from “losers” that are left behind. These domestic firms 
  20are at a relative disadvantage since they chose not to bond with global capital markets. By 
cross-listing on the NYSE or Nasdaq, foreign firms commit to higher disclosure and 
greater respect for minority shareholders’ rights, since the listing requires the firm to 
reconcile its financial statements to the U.S. GAAP, to comply with the U.S. SEC, and to 
meet the requirements of the exchange on which it lists. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) 
argue that the positive valuation effect of creating ADR programs stems from the 
enhanced ability of these firms to take advantage of growth opportunities as they bond 
with the U.S. market. A U.S. listing enhances the protection of investors and reduces the 
agency costs of controlling shareholders. With lower agency costs firms will have greater 
access to outside finance and will be in a better position to fund projects and to take 
advantage of growth opportunities. In this section we test whether the negative valuation 
impact that rivals experience is related to the bonding hypothesis for cross-listing, as 
Stulz (1999) suggests.  
 
IV.B.1. IndustryDeterminants of Negative Spillover Effects 
We first look at the different outcomes on rival firms from different industries. 
According to the bonding hypothesis, rival firms should be affected depending on 
whether or not the listing firm and the rival are in a high or low growth industry. In 
particular, the relative disadvantage of firms that chose not to bond with the U.S. market 
should be stronger in industries with higher growth opportunities, as firms that cross-list 
from these industries by bonding with the U.S. market, will have more external finance 
accessible to fund their growth. We expect stronger positive effects on listing firms from 
high growth industries, as they are better able to take advantage of growth opportunities 
  21than firms from low growth industries. Similarly, we expect stronger negative effects on 
rival firms from high growth industries, since they are at a relatively greater disadvantage 
than their low growth industry counterparts.  
Following Bekaert et al. (2007) who use country price/earnings ratios as measures 
of country growth opportunities, we measure an industry’s growth opportunities with its 
P/E ratio. In particular, we measure an industry’s growth opportunities by looking for the 
monthly P/E ratio in Datastream for each firm’s particular industry and country on the 
month prior to the announcement date. We expect to find that rival firms from industries 
with higher growth opportunities (a higher industry P/E ratio) are at a relatively larger 
disadvantage from the listing and hence they experience a more negative effect (a 
negative coefficient). The results in Model 1 of Table 6 support this proposition. Only the 
results for announcement dates are statistically significant, however both the listing date 
and announcement date regressions have the correct coefficient sign. In Model 2 of Table 
6 we include an interaction term of the industry’s P/E with the emerging market dummy. 
The results suggest that the effect of industry P/E on abnormal returns is smaller for 
emerging market firms. This is consistent with a positive risk sharing effect being present 
in emerging markets.  
IV.B.2. Country Determinants of Negative Spillover Effects 
  According to the bonding hypothesis, by listing in the U.S. firms ‘bond’ with 
the U.S. laws, and it is this increased minority shareholder protection that results in their 
better access to capital markets. The manager of a firm will therefore cross-list when the 
increased growth opportunities from the cross-listing are larger than the costs associated 
with a reduced level of expropriation. In support of this hypothesis, Reese and Weisbach 
  22(2002) show that non-U.S. firms that cross-list in the U.S. obtain better access to outside 
capital markets because the U.S. regulatory system improves the protection of minority 
shareholders. Firms should then benefit differently from the cross-listing depending on 
their increased level of minority shareholder protection. We therefore expect a cross-
sectional difference in the impact on listing firms and their rivals from countries with 
distinct minority shareholder protection levels. Other things equal, rival firms from 
countries with weak minority shareholder protection would be at a stronger relative 
disadvantage compared to rivals from countries with stronger minority shareholder 
protection. We thus predict a stronger price decrease for rival firms associated with a 
listing firm that has a stronger increase in minority shareholder protection, as they would 
be at a greater relative disadvantage. We use six different measures of investor protection 
in the home country: legal tradition, rule of law, efficiency of the judicial system, risk of 
expropriation, corruption, and anti-director rights.  
As a first measure of country corporate governance, we construct a dummy 
variable that equals one whenever the listing firm is from a country with civil law 
tradition, and 0 if it is from a country with common law tradition. Based upon prior 
research (La Porta et. al.(1997, 1998, 2000)), we expect to find that rival firms from 
countries with civil law tradition should be hurt more by the listing than rival firms from 
common law tradition, since the increase in shareholder protection from the listing is 
greater in the former case. The rule of law measure ranges from zero to 10, with 10 being 
a high law and order tradition. The efficiency of the judicial system measure ranges from 
zero to 10, with 10 representing high efficiency levels. The risk of expropriation index  
ranges from zero to 10, with 10 representing the lowest expropriation risk. Legal 
  23tradition, rule of law, efficiency of the judicial system and risk of expropriation are taken 
from La Porta et. al. (1998), where more detailed descriptions can be found. We measure 
corruption using the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
2002. The index measures how the public perceives the level of corruption of their public 
officials and politicians, and it ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being a highly clean country 
with no perceived corruption. Finally, the anti-director rights index ranges from 0 to 6, 
where 6 represents the strongest shareholder rights in the home country. This index is 
taken from Djankov et al. (2005).  
  Our hypothesis is that, other things equal stronger price decreases should be 
observed for rival firms associated with a listing firm that has a stronger increase in 
minority shareholder protection, as they would be at a stronger relative disadvantage. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between the level of minority shareholder 
protection at home and abnormal returns of the rival.  We thus predict positive 
coefficients on rule of law, corruption, antidirector, efficiency of the judicial system, and 
risk of expropriation, as these variables are higher for better protection of minority 
shareholders. We expect a negative coefficient on the civil law dummy.  
  The results are reported in Table 7. In Models 1-6 we regress each variable against 
abnormal returns one at a time since they all measure investor protection and are highly 
correlated, and we include all variables in Model 7. Out of the 12 regressions in Table 7, 
5 have the predicted coefficient sign, 2 have the opposite coefficient sign, and in 5 the 
coefficient is not significant. The results suggest that these measures of country minority 
shareholder protection might be confounded with some other important variables that 
determine abnormal returns. It is thus better to analyze this issue in a multivariate setting. 
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variables. For now, we note that in Model 7, where all variables are included, support is 
found for the bonding and growth opportunities hypothesis at the time of listing. 
Additionally, size is still an important determinant of abnormal returns at the time of 
listing: larger rival firms are hurt by less with the listing. Finally, the coefficient for the 
number of days between the listing and the announcement of listing suggests that, as 
there is more time between the announcement and the listing, rival firms experience more 
negative abnormal returns.  
IV.B.3. Company Determinants of Negative Spillover Effects 
Other things equal, the growth opportunities hypothesis predicts that the benefits 
from cross-listing should be greater for those firms that have the greatest growth 
prospects. As these firms cross-list as a means to reduce agency costs, get greater access 
to outside finance, and thus take advantage of their growth opportunities, their rivals are 
negatively impacted. Their decision not to list puts them at a disadvantage compared to 
their cross-listing counterparts. This effect should be stronger for high growth firms that 
require more equity capital for growth. We expect that rival firms with better growth 
prospects are more negatively impacted by the listing.  
  We use three measures of the rival firm’s growth opportunities: the price to 
earnings ratio, their one year sales growth, and the market to book ratio. We obtain each 
rival’s P/E ratio on the month prior to the announcement from Datastream. We obtain the 
one year sales growth for the rival firm in the fiscal year ending prior to the listing (or 
announcement) date from Worldscope. Sales growth has also been used in the literature 
to proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004); Doidge, et 
  25al. (2007); Billett, King and Mauer (2007)). Finally, market to book ratio is as of the 
fiscal year ending prior to the listing (announcement) date and it comes from 
Worldscope. The measure has been used to proxy for Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
investment opportunities. Billett, King and Mauer (2007) use it as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. Higher P/E ratio, higher growth, and higher M/B proxy for greater growth 
opportunities.  
  We hypothesize that rival firms with greater growth opportunities are seen at a 
stronger relative disadvantage and they should be impacted more. Hence, we expect the 
coefficient on these variables to be negative. Further, the effects of these variables in 
emerging markets should be less strong, since we have both a growth opportunities and a 
risk sharing effect working against each other there. Therefore, we expect a positive 
coefficient on the interactive variable of the rival firm’s growth opportunities with the 
emerging market dummy.  
  The results are presented in Table 8. In all cases of significance the coefficients 
have the signs that support the previously discussed hypothesis. There seem to be 
significant effects at both the listing and the announcement dates. There are stronger 
negative effects associated with the cross-listing for higher growth rival firms, compared 
to lower growth rival firms. As in other cross-sectional regressions, size and the number 
of days between the listing and the announcement date seem to play an important role in 
explaining listing-date abnormal returns.  
 
IV.C. Risk Sharing Vs. Growth Opportunities Hypothesis 
  26  The previous two sections show support for both the risk sharing and the growth 
opportunities hypothesis. We found that rival firms from emerging markets that are more 
correlated with the listing firm are associated with more positive abnormal returns, 
supporting the risk sharing hypothesis. We also found that firms in high growth industries 
are affected more, which supports the growth opportunities hypothesis; however this 
effect is smaller for emerging market firms, in defense of the risk sharing hypothesis. In 
addition, rival firms with stronger growth opportunities, as measured by their higher P/E 
ratios, sales growth, and M/B ratio, have more negative abnormal returns from the listing, 
consistent with the growth opportunities hypothesis. The effect of the level of shareholder 
protection in the home country on abnormal returns of rival firms is indeterminate, as it 
depended on the measure of protection used, and we suspect is due to other variables not 
being included in the same model. In this section we simultaneously test both hypotheses 
by regressing abnormal returns of rivals on variables that can be linked to both the risk 
sharing and the growth opportunities hypothesis. We choose the variables from each 
section that better explain abnormal returns. To test risk sharing, we use correlation and 
the interaction term correlation*emerging. To test growth opportunities, we use rule of 
law (for country corporate governance), industry P/E (for general-industry growth 
opportunities), and firm P/E and one-year growth (as firm measures of growth 
opportunities). We also include the control variables used in other specifications: 
emerging, size of the rival firms, number of days between the announcement and the 
listing, and foreign sales to total sales.  
  The results, presented in Table 9, are strong in that they are consistent between 
announcement and listing day abnormal returns. Once all variables are included in the 
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or industry growth) is the most important determinant of abnormal returns on rival firms. 
Specifically, higher growth rivals are affected by more from the cross-listing. This is 
consistent with the growth opportunities hypothesis as rivals with greater growth 
potential would be at a greater disadvantage from the listing, and hence they are hurt by 
more from the listing event. We note also that the insignificant coefficient of the 
corporate governance variable does not depend on our choice of the variable. We tried 
the same specification with each of our six corporate governance variables and in no case 
was the coefficient of this variable significant. The coefficient for emerging*correlation 
is not significant, however the coefficient sign is consistent with there being a 
liberalization effect for emerging market rivals. The coefficient for the number of days 
between the announcement and the listing suggests that the more time passes since the 
announcement took place, the more negative is the impact on the rival firm. Finally, we 
note a significant improvement in the fit of the regression once all variables are included 
in the specification. Overall, the results present a picture of rivals at cross-listing events 
where revised perceptions of growth opportunities are likely to be dominant in firm 
valuation.  
V. Conclusion 
  In this paper we ask whether there are benefits or costs of cross-listing to other 
firms in the domestic country, by studying the stock price effects on rival firms 
associated with a cross-listing in the U.S. The evidence indicates that when a firm cross-
lists in the U.S., its primary rival in the home market that is not listed in the U.S. is hurt 
by the listing. Our results are consistent with the idea that firms cross-list as a means to 
  28reduce agency costs of controlling shareholders and thus are able to exploit growth 
opportunities as they have better access to external finance. Rival firms left behind are 
seen at a relative disadvantage to the cross-listing firms.  
Theory suggests that there is a positive effect on rivals due to a decrease in the 
cost of capital that competes against the negative effects associated with rival firms being 
viewed at a relative disadvantage because of their decision not to list. The empirical 
evidence indicates that the negative spillover effect is the dominating effect on rival share 
prices. Rival firms tend to suffer when listing firms list their stock in the United States.  
Our cross-sectional analysis provides support for both the positive risk sharing 
effect of cross-listing, and the negative growth opportunities effect. When we 
simultaneously test both hypotheses, the growth opportunities effect dominates, as we 
find that rival firms with greater growth prospects are hurt by more from the cross-listing. 
Our results thus support the idea that firms cross-list in the U.S. to bond with U.S. laws, 
reduce agency costs, and hence have better access to external capital and exploit 
opportunities for growth.  
A public policy implication of these findings is that listing in the U.S. should be 
viewed as creating incentives for better disclosure and law enforcement in the home 
market. More transparent accounting and corporate governance standards, as well as 
stricter laws in the home market might serve as a partial substitute for a U.S. listing.  
Given current institutional differences across countries, the effects of a U.S. 
listing are not all favorable for the home market of the listing firm. Those left behind 
without a U.S. listing tend to experience a negative price impact.  
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  33Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample. 
 
This table summarizes the sample data. There are a total of 146 firms in the sample, coming from 21 
countries. The time period covered is between 1986 and 2002. The table presents the data composition by 
region, industry, country, year listed in the U.S., emerging and developed market firms, and firms from 




Number of Firms      Industry Number of Firms 
Latin America  12      Resources  11 
Asia 22      Basic  Industries  17 
Europe 57      General  Industries 7 
Oceania 7      Consumer  Goods  32 
Canada 48      Services  20 
       Utilities  7 
       Information  Technology  20 
       Financials  32 
          
          
Country 
      
Year Listed 
  
Argentina 2      1986  2 
Australia 7      1987  6 
Belgium 1      1988  2 
Brazil   5      1989  5 
Canada 48      1990  1 
Chile 4      1991  3 
Finland 1      1992  3 
France 8      1993  4 
Germany 8      1994  7 
India 7      1995  5 
Ireland 2      1996  17 
Italy 3      1997  8 
Japan 8      1998  5 
Korea 1      1999  11 
Mexico 1      2000  30 
Netherlands 1      2001  22 
South Korea  1      2002  15 
Spain 1         
Switzerland 5         
Taiwan 5         
UK 27         
          
          
Emerging 25         
Developed 121         
          
          
Civil Law   54         
Common Law  92         
          
 
  34Table 2 
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Listing Event 
 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the listing date for 146 rival firms in our 
sample. Results are presented for the windows (-5, -1), (-5, +1), (0, 0), (+1, +5) and (-5, +5), where day 0 
represents listing day. The third column is the precision-weighted cumulative mean abnormal return. The 
positive column reflects how many firms had positive cumulative abnormal returns in that respective 
window. The Z test statistic is a test of the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. The 
Generalized Sign Z is a test with the null hypothesis that the fraction of positive cumulative returns is the 
same as in the estimation period. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 










Positive        Z    Generalized 
    Sign Z 
          
(-5,-1)  -1.37%  -0.68% 60 -1.9990**  -1.8181* 
(-5,  +1)  -1.59%  -0.93% 60 -2.2944**  -1.8181* 
(0,0)  -0.18%  -0.26% 63 -1.7005*  -1.3214 
(+1,+5)  -0.65%  -0.45% 58 -1.3206  -2.1493** 





Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Announcement Event 
 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for 144 rival 
firms in our sample. Results are presented for the windows (-5, -1), (-5, +1), (0, 0), (+1, +5) and (-5, +5), 
where day 0 represents announcement day. The third column is the precision-weighted cumulative mean 
abnormal return. The positive column reflects how many firms had positive cumulative abnormal returns 
on that respective window. The Z test statistic is a test on the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal 
return. The Generalized Sign Z is a test with the null hypothesis that the fraction of positive cumulative 
returns is the same as in the estimation period. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at 










Positive        Z    Generalized 
    Sign Z 
          
(-5,-1)  -0.03%  0.31% 70 0.9040  0.2236 
(-5,  +1)  -0.29%  -0.01% 66 -0.0222  -0.4438 
(0,0)  -0.32%  -0.36% 54 -2.3419**  -2.4460** 
(+1,+5)  -0.10%  0.22% 63 0.6479  -0.9444 
(-5,+5)  -0.45%  0.18% 64   0.3402  -0.7775 
 
  35Table 4 
Listing and Announcement Event Abnormal Returns for Developed and Emerging Markets. 
 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the listing and announcement date for the 
121 developed market firms and the 25 emerging markets firms separately. Panel A presents the results for 
the listing event and Panel B for the announcement event. Results are presented over the windows (-5, -1), 
(-5, +1), (0, 0), (+1, +5) and (-5, +5), where day 0 represents event day. The Z test statistic is a test of the 
significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. The Generalized Sign Z is a test with the null 
hypothesis that the fraction of positive cumulative returns is the same as in the estimation period. The 
symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance of the abnormal returns at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. The last column presents the difference in the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns of the developed and emerging market samples. A test of the difference between the 
means of both samples was conducted, with no statistically significant differences found.  
 
               











in CARs  
Developed  
and Emerging 
               
Panel A. Listing Event 
              
              
(-5,-1)  -1.30% -1.9693**  -1.7892*    -1.67% -0.4918  -0.4587  0.37% 
(-5, +1)  -1.68% -2.4731**  -1.9710**   -1.15% -0.0865  -0.0563  -0.53% 
(0,0)  -0.20% -1.6601*  -1.0619    -0.05% -0.4522  -0.8611  -0.15% 
(+1,+5)  -0.85% -1.5654  -2.1529**   0.28% 0.269  -0.4587  -1.13% 
(-5,+5)  -2.35% -2.8836***  -1.9710**   -1.44% -0.2865  -0.4587  -0.91% 
              
              
Panel B. Announcement Event  
               
               
(-5,-1)  -0.08% 0.8166  0.0049    0.19% 0.3883  0.531  -0.27% 
(-5, +1)  -0.43% -0.1285  -0.7287    0.36% 0.232  0.531  -0.79% 
(0,0)  -0.31% -1.9848**  -2.1959**   -0.38% -1.2969  -1.0862  0.07% 
(+1,+5)  0.30% 1.3719  -0.1785    -1.98%  -1.4734 -1.8947*  2.28% 
(-5,+5)  -0.09% 0.8771  0.0049    -2.17% -1.1226  -1.8947*  2.08% 
               
 
  36Table 5 
Cross-sectional differences in cumulative abnormal returns  
Risk sharing hypothesis 
 
The table presents the results of a series of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage 
cumulative abnormal returns around the (-5,+5) day window around the listing and announcement dates for 
rival firms. The number inside each cell represents the coefficient estimate resulting from an OLS 
regression. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test and Newey-West standard errors adjustments.  
 
Panel A. Listing Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Constant  -1.45  -1.36  1.25 0.90 0.34 
Correlation  2.73  2.33    1.59 
Correlation*Emerging   1.89    2.13 
Time of Listing      -0.20  -0.17  -0.13 
Time of Listing*Emerging        -0.58  -0.63 
Emerging 1.54  0.81  2.23  10.52*  10.06 
Days Between  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Size Rival  0.09*  0.09**  0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10** 
Foreign  Sales  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
       
R
2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 
Adj R
2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.01 
Obs.  65 65 70 70 65 
       
 
Panel B. Announcement Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Constant  0.59 1.69 1.93 0.67 2.34 
Correlation  -0.94 -5.74     -6.20 
Correlation*Emerging   25.94***    22.31** 
Time of Listing      -0.13  -0.03  -0.05 
Time  of  Listing*Emerging     -1.72  -1.00 
Emerging -3.54  -13.02***  -3.55 20.66 2.54 
Days Between  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Size  Rival  0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.08 
Foreign  Sales  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
       
R
2 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.18 
Adj R
2 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.05 
Obs.  60 60 65 65 60 




  37Table 6 
Cross-sectional differences in cumulative abnormal returns  
Industry determinants of negative spillovers 
 
The table presents the results of a series of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage 
cumulative abnormal returns around the (-5,+5) day window around the listing and announcement dates for 
rival firms. The number inside each cell represents the coefficient estimate resulting from an OLS 
regression. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test and Newey-West standard errors adjustments.  
 
Panel A. Listing Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Constant -1.32  0.17 
Industry PE  -0.004  -0.065 
IndustryPE*emerging   0.06 
Emerging 1.64  -0.44 
Days Between  -0.01* -0.01* 
Size Rival  0.11**  0.10 
Foreign Sales  -0.02  -0.02 
    
R
2 0.11 0.15 
Adj R
2 0.04 0.06 
Obs. 65  65 
    
 
Panel B. Announcement Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Constant 0.14  1.81 
Industry PE  -0.004** -0.065** 
IndustryPE*emerging   0.061** 
Emerging -2.01  -4.96 
Days Between  -0.01  0.00 
Size Rival  0.04  0.03 
Foreign Sales  0.01  0.01 
    
R
2 0.11 0.17 
Adj R
2 0.02 0.07 
Obs. 60  60 
    
 
 
  38Table 7 
Cross-sectional differences in cumulative abnormal returns 
 Country determinants of negative spillovers 
 
The table presents the results of a series of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage 
cumulative abnormal returns around the (-5,+5) day window around the listing and announcement dates for 
rival firms. The number inside each cell represents the coefficient estimate resulting from an OLS 
regression. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test and Newey-West standard errors adjustments.  
 
Panel A. Listing Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
             
Constant -1.43  -16.08**  -5.51  8.83** 28.28**  -66.91***  -21.50 
Civil 2.75          -2.06 
Rule of Law    1.55**        -1.30 
Corruption     0.48       0.24 
Antidirector       -2.34***     -2.09 
Efficiency        -3.11**   -2.34 
Risk of Expropriation          6.80** 6.42* 
Emerging 1.21  6.86**  3.60 2.76  -5.47  11.71***  3.57 
Days Between  -0.01*  -0.01 -0.01  -0.02** -0.01*  -0.01*  -0.01* 
Size Rival  0.11*** 0.13***  0.12**  0.12***  0.12*** 0.10**  0.10** 
Foreign  Sales  -0.03 -0.02  -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 -0.03  -0.03 
            
R
2 0.14 0.15  0.11 0.17  0.16 0.17  0.21 
Adj R
2 0.07 0.08  0.04 0.11  0.10 0.10  0.07 
Obs.  69 70  69 70  69 69  69 
            
 
Panel B. Announcement Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
           
Constant 0.21  -25.02*** -26.96** 7.63 -0.86  -94.00***  -57.69 
Civil 0.15         -3.38 
Rule of Law    2.67***       -0.89 
Corruption     3.13**      2.92 
Antidirector      -1.70      -4.16 
Efficiency         0.11    1.94 
Risk of Expropriation            9.78***  4.23 
Emerging -4.02  3.95  8.84  -3.57  -3.70  9.29** 17.47** 
Days  Between  -0.01 -0.01  0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 
Size  Rival  0.04 0.06  0.05  0.05 0.04 0.01  0.04 
Foreign  Sales  0.01 0.00  0.01  0.00 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 
            
R
2 0.07 0.18  0.19  0.10 0.07 0.18  0.26 
Adj R
2 -0.01  0.11 0.11  0.03  -0.01  0.11 0.12 
Obs.  64 64  64  65 64 64  64 
            
 
 
  39Table 8 
Cross-sectional differences in cumulative abnormal returns 
Company determinants of negative spillovers  
 
The table presents the results of a series of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage 
cumulative abnormal returns around the (-5,+5) day window around the listing and announcement dates for 
rival firms. The number inside each cell represents the coefficient estimate resulting from an OLS 
regression. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test and Newey-West standard errors adjustments.  
 
Panel A. Listing Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
        
Constant  -0.61 -0.40 -0.46 -0.48 -0.88 -0.54 
PE ratio rival  -0.03* -0.03**      
Rival’s  Growth   -0.01  -0.003    
Rival Market to book          -0.10**  -0.20 
PE  *  Emerging   0.05      
Growth  *  Emerging     -0.15    
MB  *  Emerging      0.10 
Emerging  0.90 -0.70  1.10 6.18 3.24 2.80 
Days Between  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
Size Rival  0.08  0.08  0.11* 0.11* 0.12* 0.13* 
Foreign  Sales  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
        
R
2 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj R
2 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Obs.  62 62 65 65 56 56 
        
 
Panel B. Announcement Date 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
        
Constant  2.82 2.79 1.65 1.82 1.81 2.93 
PE ratio rival  -0.03** -0.03**     
Rival’s Growth      -0.02* -0.02*   
Rival Market to book          -0.04  -0.35 
PE  *  Emerging   -0.03      
Growth * Emerging        0.11*    
MB  *  Emerging      0.32 
Emerging  -5.74 -4.89 -6.23 -11.74  -3.63 -4.92 
Days Between  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Size  Rival  0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Foreign  Sales  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
        
R
2 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.14 
Adj R
2 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 
Obs.  58 58 60 60 54 54 
        
 
  40Table 9 
Cross-sectional differences in cumulative abnormal returns  
Risk Sharing vs. Growth Opportunities 
 
The table presents the results of a series of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage 
cumulative abnormal returns around the (-5,+5) day window around the listing and announcement dates for 
rival firms. The number inside each cell represents the coefficient estimate resulting from an OLS 
regression. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test and Newey-West standard errors adjustments.  
 
 
 Listing  Date  Announcement  Date 
    
Constant -18.77  -13.65 
Rule of Law  1.92  1.84 
Correlation 7.31  0.81 
Correlation * Emerging  1.10  15.78 
PE Industry  0.00  0.00 
PE Rival  -0.03*** -0.03** 
Rival’s Growth  -0.07*** -0.04*** 
Emerging 6.93  -6.01 
Size rival  0.03  0.04 
Days between  -0.01**  -0.01 
Foreign Sales  0.00  0.00 
    
R
2 0.26 0.39 
Adj R
2 0.08 0.22 
Obs. 52  48 






  41CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2108 Torben M. Andersen and Michael Svarer, Flexicurity – Labour Market Performance in 
Denmark, October 2007 
 
2109 Jonathan P. Thomas and Tim Worrall, Limited Commitment Models of the Labor 
Market, October 2007 
 
2110 Carlos Pestana Barros, Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Identification 
of Segments of European Banks with a Latent Class Frontier Model, October 2007 
 
2111 Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D., Sebastian Vollmer and Immaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, 
Competitiveness – A Comparison of China and Mexico, October 2007 
 
2112 Mark Mink, Jan P.A.M. Jacobs and Jakob de Haan, Measuring Synchronicity and Co-
movement of Business Cycles with an Application to the Euro Area, October 2007 
 
2113 Ossip Hühnerbein and Tobias Seidel, Intra-regional Tax Competition and Economic 
Geography, October 2007 
 
2114 Christian Keuschnigg, Exports, Foreign Direct Investment and the Costs of Corporate 
Taxation, October 2007 
 
2115 Werner Bönte, Oliver Falck and Stephan Heblich, Demography and Innovative 
Entrepreneurship, October 2007 
 
2116 Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and M. Hashem Pesaran, Assessing Forecast Uncertainties 
in a VECX Model for Switzerland: An Exercise in Forecast Combination across Models 
and Observation Windows, October 2007 
 
2117 Ben Lockwood, Voting, Lobbying, and the Decentralization Theorem, October 2007 
 
2118 Andrea Ichino, Guido Schwerdt, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Josef Zweimüller, Too Old 
to Work, too Young to Retire?, October 2007 
 
2119 Wolfgang Eggert, Tim Krieger and Volker Meier, Education, Unemployment and 
Migration, October 2007 
 
2120 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, The European Commission – Appointment, 
Preferences, and Institutional Relations, October 2007 
 
2121 Bertil Holmlund and Martin Söderström, Estimating Income Responses to Tax 
Changes: A Dynamic Panel Data Approach, October 2007 
 
2122 Doina Maria Radulescu, From Separate Accounting to Formula Apportionment: 
Analysis in a Dynamic Framework, October 2007 
  
2123 Jelle Brouwer, Richard Paap and Jean-Marie Viaene, The Trade and FDI Effects of 
EMU Enlargement, October 2007 
 
2124 Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume, Competition and Waiting Times 
in Hospital Markets, October 2007 
 
2125 Alexis Direr, Flexible Life Annuities, October 2007 
 
2126 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Quality versus Quantity – The Composition Effect 
of Corporate Taxation on Foreign Direct Investment, October 2007 
 
2127 Balázs Égert, Real Convergence, Price Level Convergence and Inflation Differentials in 
Europe, October 2007 
 
2128 Marko Koethenbuerger, Revisiting the “Decentralization Theorem” – On the Role of 
Externalities, October 2007 
 
2129 Axel Dreher, Silvia Marchesi and James Raymond Vreeland, The Politics of IMF 
Forecasts, October 2007 
 
2130 Andreas Knabe and Ronnie Schöb, Subsidizing Extra Jobs: Promoting Employment by 
Taming the Unions, October 2007 
 
2131 Michel Beine and Bertrand Candelon, Liberalization and Stock Market Co-Movement 
between Emerging Economies, October 2007 
 
2132 Dieter M. Urban, FDI Technology Spillovers and Wages, October 2007 
 
2133 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, Optimal 
Energy Investment and R&D Strategies to Stabilise Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Concentrations, October 2007 
 
2134 David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, The Importance of Being Vigilant: Has ECB 
Communication Influenced Euro Area Inflation Expectations?, October 2007 
 
2135 Oliver Falck, Heavyweights – The Impact of Large Businesses on Productivity Growth, 
October 2007 
 
2136 Xavier Freixas and Bruno M. Parigi, Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective 
Action, November 2007 
 
2137 Jan K. Brueckner, Partial Fiscal Decentralization, November 2007 
 
2138 Silvia Console Battilana, Uncovered Power: External Agenda Setting, Sophisticated 
Voting, and Transnational Lobbying, November 2007 
 




2140 Lorenzo Cappellari, Paolo Ghinetti and Gilberto Turati, On Time and Money 
Donations, November 2007 
 
2141 Roel Beetsma and Heikki Oksanen, Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, November 2007 
 
2142 Hikaru Ogawa and David E. Wildasin, Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, 
Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking, November 2007 
 
2143 Alessandro Cigno, A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Legislation on Marriage, 
Fertility, Domestic Division of Labour, and the Education of Children, November 2007 
 
2144 Kai A. Konrad, Mobile Tax Base as a Global Common, November 2007 
 
2145 Ola Kvaløy and Trond E. Olsen, The Rise of Individual Performance Pay, November 
2007 
 
2146 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Yannis Georgellis, Nicholas Tsitsianis and Ya Ping Yin, 
Income and Happiness across Europe: Do Reference Values Matter?, November 2007 
 
2147 Dan Anderberg, Tax Credits, Income Support and Partnership Decisions, November 
2007 
 
2148 Andreas Irmen and Rainer Klump, Factor Substitution, Income Distribution, and 
Growth in a Generalized Neoclassical Model, November 2007 
 
2149 Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Direct 
Democracy – A First Global Assessment, November 2007 
 
2150 Axel Dreher, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Friedrich Schneider, The Devil is in the 
Shadow – Do Institutions Affect Income and Productivity or only Official Income and 
Official Productivity?, November 2007 
 
2151 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, International 
Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Stabilization, November 2007 
 
2152 Balázs Égert and Dubravko Mihaljek, Determinants of House Prices in Central and 
Eastern Europe, November 2007 
 
2153 Christa Hainz and Hendrik Hakenes, The Politician and his Banker, November 2007 
 
2154 Josef Falkinger, Distribution and Use of Knowledge under the “Laws of the Web”, 
December 2007 
 
2155 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Eduard Hochreiter, Growing Apart? A Tale of Two 
Republics: Estonia and Georgia, December 2007 
 
2156 Morris A. Davis and François Ortalo-Magné, Household Expenditures, Wages, Rents, 
December 2007  
2157 Andreas Haufler and Christian Schulte, Merger Policy and Tax Competition, December 
2007 
 
2158 Marko Köthenbürger and Panu Poutvaara, Rent Taxation and its Intertemporal Welfare 
Effects in a Small Open Economy, December 2007 
 
2159 Betsey Stevenson, Title IX and the Evolution of High School Sports, December 2007 
 
2160 Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya, Persuasion as a Contest, December 2007 
 
2161 Morten Bennedsen and Christian Schultz, Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services, 
December 2007 
 
2162 Bas Jacobs, Optimal Redistributive Tax and Education Policies in General Equilibrium, 
December 2007 
 
2163 Christian Jaag, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, Pension Reform, 
Retirement and Life-Cycle Unemployment, December 2007 
 
2164 Dieter M. Urban, Terms of Trade, Catch-up, and Home Market Effect: The Example of 
Japan, December 2007 
 
2165 Marcelo Resende and Rodrigo M. Zeidan, Lionel Robbins: A Methodological 
Reappraisal, December 2007 
 
2166 Samuel Bentolila, Juan J. Dolado and Juan F. Jimeno, Does Immigration Affect the 
Phillips Curve? Some Evidence for Spain, December 2007 
 
2167 Rainald Borck, Federalism, Fertility and Growth, December 2007 
 
2168 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium 
Unemployment, December 2007 
 
2169 Egil Matsen and Øystein Thøgersen, Habit Formation, Strategic Extremism and Debt 
Policy, December 2007 
 
2170 Torben M. Andersen and Allan Sørensen, Product Market Integration and Income 
Taxation: Distortions and Gains from Trade, December 2007 
 
2171 J. Atsu Amegashie, American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity 
Contest?, December 2007 
 
2172 Patricia Apps and Ray Rees, Household Models: An Historical Perspective, December 
2007 
 
2173 Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner, The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality 
and Trust – An Experimental Study, December 2007 
 
2174 Michael Melvin and Magali Valero, The Dark Side of International Cross-Listing: 
Effects on Rival Firms at Home, December 2007 